Owner of the vessel(s) “CHLOE V” v UBS AG [2026] 1 SLR 107 lays down a framework under Order 21 rule 2(6) of the Rules of Court 2021 for situations where, after losing its case, the unsuccessful party not only refuses to pay the costs ordered against it but also files an appeal, compelling the successful party to incur further costs while remaining out of pocket from the proceedings below. Once a respondent shows that an appellant has refused or neglected to pay outstanding costs, the burden shifts to the appellant to provide a good reason why a stay of proceedings should not be granted. If no good reason is given, a stay will ordinarily follow, with the appeal to be automatically struck out if costs remain unpaid beyond a certain period.
“Single-Income” or “Dual-Income” Marriage? Clarifying Marriage Classification in the Division of Matrimonial Assets: XKT v XKU [2026] SGHC(A) 7; [2026] 1 SLR 187
XKT v XKU [2026] SGHC(A) 7 clarifies the distinction between “single income” and “dual-income” marriages in Singapore family law – such classification determines the approach for the division of assets between the divorcing spouses under the Women’s Charter 1961 (2020 Rev Ed). The Appellate Division of the High Court emphasized that the inquiry does not simply turn on whether one spouse was the “primary homemaker” and the other the “primary breadwinner”. Instead, the court will consider whether the homemaking role caused the homemaker-spouse to lose the opportunity to earn income that could otherwise have been recognized as direct financial contributions under ANJ v ANK [2015] 4 SLR 1043, and thereby be disadvantaged. This was ultimately a fact-sensitive inquiry requiring a qualitative assessment of the spouses’ respective roles during the marriage.
Complain at Your Own Risk? Deemed Consent and Data Disclosure Under the PDPA: Piper, Martin v Singapore Kindness Movement [2025] SGHC 173; [2025] 5 SLR 293
In Piper, Martin v Singapore Kindness Movement [2025] 5 SLR 293, the appellant Mr Piper complained to Singapore Kindness Movement ("SKM") that a Ms Carol Loi was promoting discriminatory material in a Telegram group chat with a similar name to an SKM affiliate organisation. During its investigation, SKM disclosed Mr Piper's identity and email to Ms Loi without his consent, which Mr Loi alleged was a breach of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012. The High Court held that while Mr Piper was deemed to have consented to the use of his personal data for the purpose of investigating his complaint, SKM's disclosures to Ms Loi exceeded the scope of that deemed consent and were unreasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, SKM was found to have breached sections 13 and 18(a) of the PDPA.
Seeking Recourse from Harassment: Process of Action in the POHA Tribunal
The proliferation of social media, and now generative AI, has given harassment a reach and intensity that would have been hard to imagine two decades ago. The Protection from Harassment Court ("PHC") was established to provide a faster, more accessible route to recourse. However, knowing how to get started with a claim remains far from simple, and can be daunting for a victim of harassment. Through this piece, Year 3 LL.B. student Amber Tng Kai Enn seeks to bridge that gap, breaking down how to bring a claim under the Protection from Harassment Act ("POHA") – from the preliminary steps of identifying the applicable statutory ground and choosing the appropriate remedy, through to the procedural steps for commencing a claim. She concludes that while the PHC has improved access to justice, scope remains to make the process easier for unrepresented victims to navigate, a need that will only grow as harassment takes on new forms, such as deepfakes.
Clarifying Criminal Conspiracy Charges: Soh Chee Wen v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2025] SGCA 49; [2025] 2 SLR 176
Soh Chee Wen v PP [2025] 2 SLR 176 arose from the 2013 penny stocks crash, to date the “largest market manipulation case in Singapore’s history”. Mr Soh Chee Wen (“Mr Soh”) and Ms Quah Su-Ling (“Ms Quah”) were charged and convicted of being involved in a criminal conspiracy to manipulate the markets for and prices of three counters that were being traded on the Singapore Exchange. Mr Soh and Ms Quah appealed against their convictions. The Court of Appeal (“CA”) rejected Mr Soh’s and Ms Quah’s arguments that the charges were not made out and upheld the convictions. In doing so, the CA made various clarifications regarding criminal conspiracy charges under section 120B of the Penal Code.
“Matters” for the Court’s Intervention in Arbitration: DMZ v DNA [2025] SGCA 52; [2025] 2 SLR 398
In DMZ v DNA [2025] SGCA 52, the Court of Appeal held that a two-step inquiry applies for determining whether Article 5 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration prohibits Singapore court intervention in any given case: a) whether the application for the court’s intervention concerns a “matter” governed by the Model Law; and b) whether the intended intervention is permitted, either because the legislation does make express provision for such intervention, or if not, then because the grant of relief is warranted. The court will not seek to second-guess a procedural determination, absent express empowerment to do so under the Model Law or the International Arbitration Act 1994. The Court also made some observations regarding rules 40.1 and 40.2 of the Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre.
When Blockchain Whitepapers Are Not Automatic Representations of Fact: da Silveira, Virgilio Tarrago and another v Hashstacs Pte Ltd and another [2025] SGCA(I) 3
In da Silveira, Virgilio Tarrago and another v Hashstacs Pte Ltd and another [2025] SGCA(I) 3, the Court of Appeal addressed investor claims of misrepresentation against Hashstacs Pte Ltd (Hashstacs (SG)) arising from a Whitepaper and launch website for a “STACS Protocol” blockchain project. The Court dismissed the investors’ claims against Hashstacs (SG), holding that Hashtacs (SG)'s role in merely editing and uploading the Whitepaper did not make it a representor, as it never adopted the statements therein as its own. Additionally, the statements merely reflected the ambitions of the publishers, and were not representations of present fact or present intention capable of being true or false at the time they were made. Further, there is a clear distinction between enforceable contractual duties as to the future, and misrepresentations of past and present fact in the tort of deceit.
A revised approach to interpreting the statutory requirements for the exercise of the right of forfeiture Campbell Hospitality Pte Ltd and others v Marchmont Pte Ltd and another appeal [2025] SGHC(A) 6; [2025] 1 SLR 816
I. Executive Summary A tenancy is “determined” (i.e. terminated) when the landlord exercises his right to “forfeit” the lease. To exercise the right of forfeiture, the landlord must first satisfy the statutory requirements under section 18(1) of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act 1886 (2020 Rev Ed) (“CLPA”). Further, if the landlord accepts any … Continue reading A revised approach to interpreting the statutory requirements for the exercise of the right of forfeiture Campbell Hospitality Pte Ltd and others v Marchmont Pte Ltd and another appeal [2025] SGHC(A) 6; [2025] 1 SLR 816
Constitutionality of Presumptions under the Misuse of Drugs Act: Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed & 3 Ors v Attorney-General [2025] 1 SLR 1287, [2025] SGCA 40
I. Executive Summary This case involves the following statutory presumptions. Section 17 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (2020 Rev Ed) (“MDA”) states that where an accused is in possession of more than a certain quantity of a controlled drug, he is presumed to have possessed the drug for the purpose of trafficking, unless … Continue reading Constitutionality of Presumptions under the Misuse of Drugs Act: Jumaat bin Mohamed Sayed & 3 Ors v Attorney-General [2025] 1 SLR 1287, [2025] SGCA 40
Trade mark infringement in the age of internet advertising: East Coast Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd v Family Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 914; [2025] SGCA 28
I. Executive Summary East Coast Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd v Family Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd [2025] SGCA 28 clarifies Singapore’s approach to trade mark infringement, particularly in the context of internet advertising. This dispute arose when Family Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd (“Family Podiatry”) used Google’s advertising services (“Google Ads”) to display internet advertisements featuring the … Continue reading Trade mark infringement in the age of internet advertising: East Coast Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd v Family Podiatry Centre Pte Ltd [2025] 1 SLR 914; [2025] SGCA 28