*By: Don Ho Jia Hao I. IntroductionThis case is the latest instalment of more than a decade of litigation on the constitutionality of s 377A of the Penal Code (“PC”). Section 377A provides:Outrages on decency377A. Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure … Continue reading The Endgame of Section 377A Litigation: Case note on Tan Seng Kee v Attorney-General  SGCA 16
In recent years, the higher courts have been issuing more sentencing guidelines to ensure the consistency of sentences being meted out to offenders. In Mao Xuezhong v Public Prosecutor (“Mao Xuezhong”), a three-Judge coram of the High Court issued a new sentencing guideline for offences under s 15(3A) of the Workplace Safety and Health Act (“WSHA”):
Traditionally, directors are said to only owe a duty of care to their company. In certain circumstances however, directors may also owe a personal duty of care to their clients, thereby rendering the director personally liable to the client. In Sim Tee Meng v Haw Wan Sin David  SGCA 71, the Court of Appeal applied the Spandeck framework in establishing whether a duty of care was owed by a key executive officer to the company's clients.
In a referendum held on 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union. Since then, the government’s attempts to initiate the withdrawal process have not only been fraught with political disagreement and delays, but have also prompted several constitutional law challenges.
In the decision of BOI v BOJ, the Court of Appeal clarified that lottery winnings received during a marriage constitute matrimonial assets to be divided between parties, should they divorce. The court also set out the approach to attributing contributions from lottery winnings. Instead of examining who purchased the winning ticket, the court will focus on the intention with which the ticket was purchased. For parties seeking a divorce, this approach creates a greater responsibility to clearly show their intention that the winnings be fully attributed to them.
The recent case of Nurun Novi Saydur Rahman v Public Prosecutor was the first time an offence under s 15(3A) of the Workplace Safety and Health Act (“WSHA”) had been brought before the Singapore High Court. The High Court introduced a new two-stage sentencing framework to be applied to such offences. This paper examines the rationale and implications of the proposed sentencing framework.
In the tort of negligence, damages are awarded if the claimant can establish that he has suffered loss. While most claims for loss in the tort of negligence usually revolve around physical damage, courts have recognised losses of a non-physical nature, including claims for pure economic loss or loss of genetic affinity. Courts, however, have consistently refused to recognise claims for a loss of chance in the context of medical negligence. Simply put, a lost chance arises where negligence on the part of the doctor deprives the patient of his chances of recovery.
Where a contract is illegal, the contract is void and the courts will not enforce the contract. Despite the simplicity of the foregoing logic, the concept of illegality in contract law – often used as a defence mechanism in lawsuits – has long vexed students and practitioners alike. As Lady Justice Gloster in Patel v Mirza (“Patel”) remarked, it is “almost impossible to ascertain or articulate principled rules from the authorities relating to the recovery of money or other assets paid or transferred under illegal contracts”.
In Singapore, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in Ting Siew May v Boon Lay Choo (“Ting Siew May”) sought to overcome this difficulty by establishing a two-stage approach to the application of the principles of statutory illegality, common law illegality and restitutionary recovery. In the later case of Ochroid Trading Ltd v Chua Siok Lui (“Ochroid”), the CA affirmed the Ting Siew May framework and the principles encapsulated within. In coming to its decision, the CA in Ochroid also considered and rejected the approach adopted by the UK Supreme Court in Patel, which, essentially, determines whether a contract should be struck down for illegality based on a range of factors.
The recent UK Supreme Court’s decision in Rock Advertising Limited v MWB Business Exchange Centres Limited was highly anticipated. Modern litigation rarely raises new fundamental issues in the law of contract; this case, however, dealt with two. The first issue was whether a contractual term providing that an agreement can only be modified in writing and must be signed by both parties was effective. Such terms are commonly referred to as “No Oral Modification” clauses. The second issue was whether an agreement to vary a payment obligation was supported by consideration.
The High Court in the recent matter of Wong Souk Yee v Attorney-General introduced techniques of statutory interpretation heretofore absent from Singapore constitutional law. In interpreting Article 49(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (“the Constitution”), Chua Lee Ming J (“Chua J”), faced with a seemingly conflicting provision in s 24(2A) of the Parliamentary Elections Act (“PEA”), had recourse to an updating construction and a rectifying construction of Article 49(1). This case note briefly analyses the judgment and explores some fundamental issues arising from employing these two methods of statutory interpretation on constitutional provisions.