Instalment Payments and the Penalty Doctrine: Ethoz Capital Ltd v Im8ex Pte Ltd and others [2023] SGCA 3

Under contract law in Singapore, parties are generally free to enter contracts and undertake what are known as “primary obligations”, and are also free to change their mind and break their primary obligations if they so wish, albeit at a price (eg by paying damages). Any clause that essentially forces compliance with the primary obligations of a contract will be considered an unenforceable penalty. This is known as the “penalty doctrine”. In Ethoz Capital Ltd v Im8ex Pte Ltd and others [2023] SGCA 3, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) further developed the penalty doctrine. Specifically, the CA held that there was a difference between paying a debt owed in instalments over a period of time, and the immediate and full payment of said debt owed upon default. In this case, the CA held that the primary obligation here was for payment of interest on the loan in question in instalments, and that the contractual requirement for the latter upon the debtor’s default was, under the circumstances, an unenforceable penalty. Further, the CA recognised that while the burden of proving that a clause is a penalty generally rests with the party making the claim, when there is evidence to show that a clause is a penalty, the evidential burden would then shift to the other party to prove otherwise.

Singapore Medical Council v Wee Teong Boo [2023] SGHC 180 – Applying the Wong Meng Hang sentencing framework for professional misconduct in the medical context

In Singapore Medical Council v Wee Teong Boo [2023] SGHC 180, the Singapore High Court ("HC") had to consider the appropriate sentence for the respondent, a medical practitioner who was found guilty of 20 charges of professional misconduct, including ten for inappropriately prescribing certain medicines ("Inappropriate Prescription charges"). Although an application of the relevant sentencing framework would have led to an indicative sentencing range of between two to three years' suspension for each Inappropriate Prescription charge, the HC stressed that this could be departed from where appropriate. Particularly in cases where an errant doctor faced multiple charges, which each attracted a substantial suspension term, it would be appropriate to consider if the doctor’s overall misconduct warrants striking him off instead. Because the respondent had, with respect to the Inappropriate Prescription charges, flagrantly abused his privilege as a medical practitioner, systemically disregarded his patients' well-being, and persistently failed to appreciate his misconduct’s seriousness, the HC held that he was unfit to remain a medical practitioner. He was thus struck off the Register of Medical Practitioners.

Divorce Proceedings: the Power of Intent in the Division of Assets Acquired by Gift or Inheritance: CLC v CLB [2023] SGCA 10

In a divorce, by virtue of section 112 of the Women's Charter 1961, any gifted or inherited assets are not usually included in the matrimonial pool of assets to be divided. However, where a spouse manifests a clear and unambiguous intention to treat such an asset as part of the family estate, should the courts give effect to such an intention? This issue arose in CLC v CLB [2023] SGCA 10. There, the Husband argued that certain monies which he had received from his late father should be excluded from the matrimonial pool, and not be subject to division with the Wife. The Court of Appeal clarified that section 112 did not preclude the courts from giving effect to a spouse’s intention to bring non-matrimonial assets into the matrimonial pool in accordance with principles of property law. As the Husband had demonstrated a clear and unambiguous intention to incorporate the disputed monies into the family estate, they were deemed matrimonial assets and subject to division.

The Determination of Arbitrability at the Pre-award Stage: Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1

In arbitration disputes, one issue that often arises is whether the dispute's subject matter is even arbitrable (“subject-matter arbitrability”). The issue may be complicated by the arbitration agreement being subject to different jurisdictions' laws, as the law governing the agreement, the law of the seat (i.e. the law governing the arbitration process), and the law of the forum (i.e. the jurisdiction where the arbitration occurs), may differ. In such a situation, which law(s) should be applied to determine the dispute's subject-matter arbitrability? This issue arose in Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1. There, the company appealed against the Singapore High Court's decision to grant an anti-suit injunction ("ASI") against it to restrain it from continuing to sue an investor in another jurisdiction, because the dispute's subject matter was arbitrable under the law of the seat (i.e. Singapore law) and thus ought to have been arbitrated pursuant to the arbitration agreement. The Singapore Court of Appeal ("SGCA") held that at the pre-award stage, a dispute's subject-matter arbitrability should be determined using a “composite” approach. Specifically, the subject-matter must be arbitrable under both the laws governing the arbitration agreement and the seat. On the facts, the SGCA found that the law governing the arbitration agreement was also Singapore law, and held that the dispute's subject matter was arbitrable under the same. There was also no reason for the ASI to be stayed on case management grounds. The SGCA hence upheld the ASI granted against the company.

Admission to the Singapore Bar: Clarifying the Framework for Situations of Applicant Misconduct Re Suria Shaik Aziz [2023] SGHC 129

In a recent 2023 case, the General Division of the High Court ("HC") had to consider whether the applicant, who had committed plagiarism in respect of a law school assignment, could be admitted to the Singapore Bar. The HC reiterated that where there is no question as to the competence or qualifications of the applicant, the relevant central inquiry is whether the applicant is suitable for admission in terms of his character. Finding that the applicant continued to demonstrate a lack of insight into the ethical implications of his misconduct, the HC granted him leave to withdraw his application for admission, subject to his undertaking not to bring a fresh application for admission in Singapore or to the bar in any other jurisdiction for four months. Notably, the HC also clarified that those who wish to be part-called to the Singapore Bar in the future should disclose any prior misconduct that may affect their suitability to practice at the first opportunity in their part-call affidavits. The failure to do so would be taken into account by the courts in assessing their suitability to be admitted.

The requirements of proper character befitting a lawyer: Re Tay Jie Qi and another matter [2023] SGHC 59

In Singapore, those who wish to be admitted to the Bar must demonstrate proper character befitting that of an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore. What, then, happens if an applicant has a prior record of misconduct? This issue arose in Re Tay Jie Qi and another matter [2023] SGHC 59, where the High Court ("HC") had to consider whether the two applicants were suitable for admission to the Bar. One applicant had committed plagiarism while in law school. The other applicant had, also while in law school, committed shoplifting; separately, a slab of illegal substance was found in her sister’s bag while they were out clubbing. The HC noted that their wrongdoing had occurred some time ago. The HC further observed that both applicants had voluntarily disclosed their misconduct despite that information not being in the public domain; were not involved in any other type of unsatisfactory conduct in the intervening years; and demonstrated repentance and remorse for their misconduct. Their willingness to face up to their mistakes and to deal "candidly and forthrightly" with the relevant stakeholders was “heartening”. The HC also emphasised that the purpose of a deferment in Bar admission applications is not punitive, but a rehabilitative one. As such, the HC allowed both their applications for admission to the Bar and welcomed them to the profession.

The importance of proper and adequate pleadings: How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] SGCA 21

A pleading is a legal document through which a party sets out its case. It serves two key functions. First, pleadings critically define each party's case, thereby preventing the other parties from being taken by surprise. Second, pleadings assist the court in ascertaining the issues in dispute which require determination. So what happens when a party fails to plead its case adequately? This issue arose in How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] SGCA 21 ("How Weng Fan (Pleadings)"). This was the follow up from the previous case of How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2022] SGCA 72, where the CA held that all seven defendants had breached their tortious duty of skill and care owed to the claimants. However, it left open the question as to the appropriate orders to be made, because one of the claimants appeared to not have adequately pleaded its case in tort against the seven defendants. Against this context, in How Weng Fan (Pleadings), after clarifying the relevant principles of pleadings, the CA held that the claimant in question did not plead a case in tort against three out of seven of the Town Council members. They were thus held to not be liable to this claimant in this regard.

Eligibility as a bar to beneficial interest in HDB Properties? Clarifying the scope of section 51(10) of the HDA: Ong Chai Soon v Ong Chai Koon and others [2022] SGCA 36

In Singapore, there is a general prohibition against the purchase of any additional properties from the Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) if a person or his/her spouse already owns such property. To get around this prohibition, parties have often made trust arrangements, where legal title to the HDB property is held by one party, but the benefit of the property is enjoyed by another person holding “beneficial interest” in the property. To guard against such arrangements, Parliament enacted section 51(10) of the Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed), which provided that no person shall become entitled to a property sold by the HDB under any trust (whether resulting or constructive). However, two competing interpretations arose. The first was that the provision only barred "ineligible persons" from acquiring any interest in HDB property under a resulting or constructive trust. The second was that the provision barred all persons (including eligible persons) from becoming entitled to a beneficial interest in a HDB property under a trust, if they did not already have an entitlement to the property in question. In Ong Chai Soon v Ong Chai Koon and others [2022] SGCA 36, the Court of Appeal endorsed the first interpretation, holding that it would be more consistent with Parliament’s intention. The court also stated that this interpretation would equally apply to section 58(11) of the Housing and Development Act 1959 (2020 Rev Ed) (“2020 HDA”), which is the equivalent, albeit with some minor differences, of section 51(10) of the previous version of the Act.

Clarification On Defence for Employees & The Right of Private Action Under The Personal Data Protection Act: Reed, Michael v Bellingham, Alex (Attorney-General Intervener) [2022] SGCA 60

In the landmark decision of Reed, Michael v Bellingham, Alex (Attorney-General Intervener) [2022] SGCA 60, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) clarified the law pertaining to two provisions of the Personal Data Protection Act (Act 26 of 2012) (“PDPA”), namely, sections 4(1)(b) and 32(1). Section 4(1)(b) of the PDPA excludes a defendant from the PDPA's operation if its requirements are made out. The CA held that for a defendant to avail himself or herself of this defence, the defendant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he or she was an “employee acting in the course of his or her employment with an organisation”. As for section 32(1) of the PDPA, this provision grants a person who has suffered "loss or damage" directly as a result of a contravention of certain provisions in the PDPA the right of action for relief in civil proceedings in a court. The CA clarified that while the scope of "loss or damage" in this provision does not include the loss of control of personal data, it includes the emotional distress caused to a claimant by the breach of his or her personal data.

Keynote Address by Professor David B. Wilkins: “From ‘Law’s Empire’ to ‘Integrated Solutions’: How Globalization, Technology, and Organizational Change Are Opening ‘New Frontiers’ For Lawyers, Clients, and Society”

On 3 August 2023, legal practitioners, academics, judges and professionals from around the globe gathered in the SMU Hall for the long-awaited conference titled “The Next Frontier of Lawyering: From ESG to GPT”. This conference is co-organised by the Singapore Management University’s Yong Pung How School of Law and the Singapore Academy of Law. The keynote speaker for this conference is Professor David B. Wilkins (Lester Kissel Professor of Law, Vice Dean, Global Initiatives on the Legal Profession, Faculty Director, Center on the Legal Profession, Harvard Law School), who delivered his keynote address titled “From “Law’s Empire” to “Integrated Solutions”: How Globalization, Technology, and Organizational Change Are Opening “New Frontiers” For Lawyers, Clients, and Society”.