Admission to the Singapore Bar: Clarifying the Framework for Situations of Applicant Misconduct Re Suria Shaik Aziz [2023] SGHC 129

In a recent 2023 case, the General Division of the High Court ("HC") had to consider whether the applicant, who had committed plagiarism in respect of a law school assignment, could be admitted to the Singapore Bar. The HC reiterated that where there is no question as to the competence or qualifications of the applicant, the relevant central inquiry is whether the applicant is suitable for admission in terms of his character. Finding that the applicant continued to demonstrate a lack of insight into the ethical implications of his misconduct, the HC granted him leave to withdraw his application for admission, subject to his undertaking not to bring a fresh application for admission in Singapore or to the bar in any other jurisdiction for four months. Notably, the HC also clarified that those who wish to be part-called to the Singapore Bar in the future should disclose any prior misconduct that may affect their suitability to practice at the first opportunity in their part-call affidavits. The failure to do so would be taken into account by the courts in assessing their suitability to be admitted.

The requirements of proper character befitting a lawyer: Re Tay Jie Qi and another matter [2023] SGHC 59

In Singapore, those who wish to be admitted to the Bar must demonstrate proper character befitting that of an advocate and solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore. What, then, happens if an applicant has a prior record of misconduct? This issue arose in Re Tay Jie Qi and another matter [2023] SGHC 59, where the High Court ("HC") had to consider whether the two applicants were suitable for admission to the Bar. One applicant had committed plagiarism while in law school. The other applicant had, also while in law school, committed shoplifting; separately, a slab of illegal substance was found in her sister’s bag while they were out clubbing. The HC noted that their wrongdoing had occurred some time ago. The HC further observed that both applicants had voluntarily disclosed their misconduct despite that information not being in the public domain; were not involved in any other type of unsatisfactory conduct in the intervening years; and demonstrated repentance and remorse for their misconduct. Their willingness to face up to their mistakes and to deal "candidly and forthrightly" with the relevant stakeholders was “heartening”. The HC also emphasised that the purpose of a deferment in Bar admission applications is not punitive, but a rehabilitative one. As such, the HC allowed both their applications for admission to the Bar and welcomed them to the profession.

The importance of proper and adequate pleadings: How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] SGCA 21

A pleading is a legal document through which a party sets out its case. It serves two key functions. First, pleadings critically define each party's case, thereby preventing the other parties from being taken by surprise. Second, pleadings assist the court in ascertaining the issues in dispute which require determination. So what happens when a party fails to plead its case adequately? This issue arose in How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2023] SGCA 21 ("How Weng Fan (Pleadings)"). This was the follow up from the previous case of How Weng Fan and others v Sengkang Town Council and other appeals [2022] SGCA 72, where the CA held that all seven defendants had breached their tortious duty of skill and care owed to the claimants. However, it left open the question as to the appropriate orders to be made, because one of the claimants appeared to not have adequately pleaded its case in tort against the seven defendants. Against this context, in How Weng Fan (Pleadings), after clarifying the relevant principles of pleadings, the CA held that the claimant in question did not plead a case in tort against three out of seven of the Town Council members. They were thus held to not be liable to this claimant in this regard.

Eligibility as a bar to beneficial interest in HDB Properties? Clarifying the scope of section 51(10) of the HDA: Ong Chai Soon v Ong Chai Koon and others [2022] SGCA 36

In Singapore, there is a general prohibition against the purchase of any additional properties from the Housing and Development Board (“HDB”) if a person or his/her spouse already owns such property. To get around this prohibition, parties have often made trust arrangements, where legal title to the HDB property is held by one party, but the benefit of the property is enjoyed by another person holding “beneficial interest” in the property. To guard against such arrangements, Parliament enacted section 51(10) of the Housing and Development Act (Cap 129, 2004 Rev Ed), which provided that no person shall become entitled to a property sold by the HDB under any trust (whether resulting or constructive). However, two competing interpretations arose. The first was that the provision only barred "ineligible persons" from acquiring any interest in HDB property under a resulting or constructive trust. The second was that the provision barred all persons (including eligible persons) from becoming entitled to a beneficial interest in a HDB property under a trust, if they did not already have an entitlement to the property in question. In Ong Chai Soon v Ong Chai Koon and others [2022] SGCA 36, the Court of Appeal endorsed the first interpretation, holding that it would be more consistent with Parliament’s intention. The court also stated that this interpretation would equally apply to section 58(11) of the Housing and Development Act 1959 (2020 Rev Ed) (“2020 HDA”), which is the equivalent, albeit with some minor differences, of section 51(10) of the previous version of the Act.

Clarification On Defence for Employees & The Right of Private Action Under The Personal Data Protection Act: Reed, Michael v Bellingham, Alex (Attorney-General Intervener) [2022] SGCA 60

In the landmark decision of Reed, Michael v Bellingham, Alex (Attorney-General Intervener) [2022] SGCA 60, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) clarified the law pertaining to two provisions of the Personal Data Protection Act (Act 26 of 2012) (“PDPA”), namely, sections 4(1)(b) and 32(1). Section 4(1)(b) of the PDPA excludes a defendant from the PDPA's operation if its requirements are made out. The CA held that for a defendant to avail himself or herself of this defence, the defendant must prove, on a balance of probabilities, that he or she was an “employee acting in the course of his or her employment with an organisation”. As for section 32(1) of the PDPA, this provision grants a person who has suffered "loss or damage" directly as a result of a contravention of certain provisions in the PDPA the right of action for relief in civil proceedings in a court. The CA clarified that while the scope of "loss or damage" in this provision does not include the loss of control of personal data, it includes the emotional distress caused to a claimant by the breach of his or her personal data.

Keynote Address by Professor David B. Wilkins: “From ‘Law’s Empire’ to ‘Integrated Solutions’: How Globalization, Technology, and Organizational Change Are Opening ‘New Frontiers’ For Lawyers, Clients, and Society”

On 3 August 2023, legal practitioners, academics, judges and professionals from around the globe gathered in the SMU Hall for the long-awaited conference titled “The Next Frontier of Lawyering: From ESG to GPT”. This conference is co-organised by the Singapore Management University’s Yong Pung How School of Law and the Singapore Academy of Law. The keynote speaker for this conference is Professor David B. Wilkins (Lester Kissel Professor of Law, Vice Dean, Global Initiatives on the Legal Profession, Faculty Director, Center on the Legal Profession, Harvard Law School), who delivered his keynote address titled “From “Law’s Empire” to “Integrated Solutions”: How Globalization, Technology, and Organizational Change Are Opening “New Frontiers” For Lawyers, Clients, and Society”.

Diminished Responsibility and the Mandatory Death Penalty in Drug Trafficking Cases: Roszaidi bin Osman v PP [2022] SGCA 75

The offence of trafficking in a controlled drug under section 5(1)(a) of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 (“MDA”) is one that typically attracts the death penalty. However, under section 33B(1)(b) of the MDA the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment in lieu of the death penalty if the offender can prove that (1) he was merely a courier and (2) he was suffering from an abnormality of mind substantially impairing his mental responsibility for the offence. In Roszaidi Bin Osman v PP, the Court of Appeal considered whether the accused’s mental responsibility for a drug trafficking offence had been substantially impaired by his major depressive disorder (“MDD”) and substance use disorder (“SUD”). In a rare 3-2 split decision, a majority of the court held that the accused's mental responsibility had been so substantially impaired. The majority found that his MDD and SUD had operated together in a synergistic manner, exacerbating his overall mental abnormality. The majority also noted that in drug trafficking offences, the court must consider whether the accused’s decision to commit the offence was itself due to his decision-making faculties being substantially impaired, instead of focussing solely on the execution of the offence.

Clarifying Presumptions and Interpretations Chong Hoon Cheong v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 50

Under section 5(1)(a) read with s 5(2) of the Misuse of Drugs Act ("MDA"), any person found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be possessing a controlled drug, knowing it is a controlled drug, and for the purposes of unauthorised trafficking, may be found guilty of drug trafficking. However, the last element (trafficking purpose) may be presumed under section 17 of the MDA if the other two elements are satisfied. What then happens if the Prosecution simultaneously mounts two alternative cases — a primary case seeking to directly prove all three elements, and an alternative case relying on the section 17 MDA presumption — and the Prosecution fails to prove its primary case but succeeds on its alternative case? The Court of Appeal (“CA”) considered this matter in Chong Hoon Cheong v Public Prosecutor [2022] SGCA 50. The CA found that the accused had neither established a reasonable doubt as to his guilt in the primary case, nor rebutted the presumption in the alternative case. However, the CA also noted that the Prosecution had needlessly complicated its case by advancing its primary case, when it could have simply relied on the section 17 MDA presumption. The CA also provided guidance on the proper approach for interpreting an accused person's statements.

Misconduct in the Bar Examinations: Consequences and the Need for Reflection and Learning Re Tay Quan Li Leon [2022] SGHC 133 and Re Wong Wai Loong Sean and other matters [2022] SGHC 237

“Lawyers are called to be ministers in the temple of justice.” So what happens when aspiring lawyers cheat during the Bar exams? In Re Tay Quan Li Leon and Re Wong Wai Loong Sean and other matters, the Singapore High Court ("HC") allowed five candidates who had cheated during the Bar exams to withdraw their applications for admission to the Bar, subject to certain terms and conditions, such as the exclusion of each candidate’s ability to bring a fresh application for Bar admission for a suitable minimum period of time. In so holding, the HC noted that the primary concern of the court in such cases is not to punish such candidates, but to ensure that they grow to become suitable for admission to the Bar. The HC also laid down a framework to aid future courts in determining the most appropriate course of action to be taken against such candidates.

Judicial Review of Vaccination-Differentiated Measures – Han Hui Hui and others v Attorney-General [2022] SGHC 141

When the COVID-19 pandemic struck the world, governments around the world - including Singapore - acted swiftly to curb the spread of the virus. Against this backdrop, Han Hui Hui and others v Attorney-General [2022] SGHC 141 came to the fore as the first judicial challenge against vaccination-differentiated safe management measures in Singapore, examining these measures on the grounds of illegality, irrationality, a breach of Article 12(1) of the Constitution of Singapore and substantive legitimate expectations.