In Public Prosecutor v Dinesh s/o Rajantheran [2019] SGCA 27, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) answered two questions by the Prosecution, regarding the proper interpretation of section 228(4) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 2012 Rev Ed) (“CPC”). Under section 228(4), the court “must reject” a party’s guilty plea if it is satisfied that any matter raised in mitigation “materially affects any legal condition” which constitutes the underlying offence.
By-elections for single vacancies in GRCs: Wong Souk Yee v Attorney-General [2019] SGCA 25
In Singapore, there are two types of electoral divisions – Single Member Constituencies (“SMCs”) and Group Representation Constituencies (“GRCs”). The number of seats in a GRC varies from 4 to 6 seats. The GRC scheme was introduced in 1988 with the goal of promoting greater minority representation. As such, each GRC must have at least one Member of Parliament (“MP”) from a minority racial group. In Wong Souk Yee v AG [2019] SGCA 25, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) addressed the question of whether a by-election for all the seats of the GRC is required when only one MP vacates his or her seat in the GRC. The CA held that a by-election is not required under such circumstances.
Amicus Briefs in the WTO: An Uneasy Compromise
An amicus curiae means a “friend of the court” who, though not a party to a lawsuit, provides the court with information or a brief because of his strong interest in the dispute. Since the Appellate Body ("AB") of the World Trade Organisation ("WTO") decided that panels may accept amicus curiae briefs in 1998, there has been extensive debate over this issue for 20 years. One of the chief criticisms from Member states of this decision is that allowing non-state actors to access the Dispute Settlement Mechanism would undermine the “Member-driven” nature of the WTO. Notwithstanding such criticisms, the AB has weathered the storms and continually affirmed the power of the WTO adjudicatory bodies to accept amicus briefs. Ironically, despite this steadfast position, they have displayed great reluctance to actually utilise amicus briefs. This seems to be an uneasy compromise to avoid potential political costs in reaction to the explicit protests from Members. Contrary to commentators that commend the AB for its management of the status quo, this paper argues against this uneasy compromise.
Arbitration: A second chance to object to the tribunal’s jurisdiction – Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd v Avant Garde Maritime Services (Private) Limited [2019] SGCA 33
In Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd v Avant Garde Maritime Services (Private) Limited [2019] SGCA 33, a respondent disagreed with an arbitral tribunal’s ruling that the tribunal had jurisdiction over the respondent’s dispute with the claimant, and did not participate in arbitral proceedings over the dispute. The respondent also did not appeal the ruling within the 30-day period. The Court of Appeal held that the respondent was not precluded by Article 16(3) of the UNCITRAL Model law from raising such objections in setting-aside proceedings.
Wilful Blindness in the Possession of Drugs: Adili Chibuike Ejike v Public Prosecutor [2019] SGCA 38
In Adili Chibuike Ejike v Public Prosecutor [2019] SGCA 38, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) clarified the operation of the doctrine of wilful blindness and its interplay with the presumption of possession under section 18(1) of the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (“MDA”)
A Code of Conduct for Collective Sale Committees: Kok Yin Chong and others v Lim Hun Joo and others [2019] SGCA 28
In Kok Yin Chong v Lim Hun Joo [2019] SGCA 28, a group of subsidiary proprietors (the “Dissenting SPs”) attempted to block the collective sale of the residential development Goodluck Garden, by challenging the conduct of three (out of six) members of the Collective Sale Committee (“CSC”). Specifically, they appealed against a decision by the High Court (“HC”) to order the collective sale of the development, on the basis that the three members of the CSC (the “Respondents”) had breached the Land Titles (Strata) Act (Cap 158, 2009 Rev Ed) (the “LTSA”) in their conduct of the sale.
Sentencing Approach for Workplace Safety Breaches: Nurun Novi Saydur Rahman v Public Prosecutor [2019] 3 SLR 413
The recent case of Nurun Novi Saydur Rahman v Public Prosecutor was the first time an offence under s 15(3A) of the Workplace Safety and Health Act (“WSHA”) had been brought before the Singapore High Court. The High Court introduced a new two-stage sentencing framework to be applied to such offences. This paper examines the rationale and implications of the proposed sentencing framework.
Conference Notes: Forum (Non) Conveniens in England – Past, Present and Future
Dr Ardavan Arzandeh (Ardavan Arzandeh, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Bristol Law School) discussed his recently published book, Forum (Non) Conveniens in England: Past, Present, and Future (Hart Publishing, 2019) during a research seminar of the same name. Here are the conference notes for this discussion of the history. application, and direction of the doctrine of forum (non) conveniens in private international law.
Lost Chance – Acceptance at last? A commentary on Armstrong, Carol Ann v Quest Laboratories Pte Ltd [2018] SGHC 66
In the tort of negligence, damages are awarded if the claimant can establish that he has suffered loss. While most claims for loss in the tort of negligence usually revolve around physical damage, courts have recognised losses of a non-physical nature, including claims for pure economic loss or loss of genetic affinity. Courts, however, have consistently refused to recognise claims for a loss of chance in the context of medical negligence. Simply put, a lost chance arises where negligence on the part of the doctor deprives the patient of his chances of recovery.
Sentencing Intellectually Disabled Young Offenders: Public Prosecutor v ASR [2019] SGCA 16
In Public Prosecutor v ASR [2019] SGCA 16, the Court of Appeal (“CA”) discussed the appropriate sentencing approach for a young offender, the respondent, who committed serious crimes, including aggravated rape and sexual assault by penetration on an intellectually disabled young girl, but who was also himself intellectually disabled, with a mental age of between eight and ten. The respondent was 14 years old when he committed the offences in question. When he was convicted in 2017, he was about 16 ½ years old. He was nearly 18 years old at the time of sentencing, in 2018.