*By Chong Kai Sheng and Alexander Wilfred Chew Fu Chong

I. INTRODUCTION

In 2016, a married couple poured scalding water over their son over the period of a week, eventually leading to his death.[1] After a series of litigation, the mother was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.[2] In another case in 2013, a man was attacked by a group of assailants: he suffered fractures to almost all his facial bones, culminating in his eventual death.[3] The assailant who orchestrated the attack was convicted of murder and sentenced to death.[4] In both of these cases, the offenders were charged for murder. Yet, despite the same charge, the Courts arrived at rather different sentencing decisions. Why was there a difference in the sentences meted out to these offenders for what looks like equally cruel acts? How do the wheels of justice work in cases involving murder?

This article seeks to shed some light on how offences involving murder are being treated by the Singapore Courts. This will be done via a two-part exploration: Part II will discuss the criminal liability an accused may face for murder. Part III will discuss the possible punishments an accused may face if convicted of murder.

II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR MURDER

For most criminal charges, the Public Prosecutor is required to prove four ingredients of a crime. First, the actus reus – the physical offending act committed by the accused.[5] Second, the mens rea – the accused must possess the requisite mental state at the time of the offence – the law does not generally punish someone who does not have a ‘guilty mind’.[6] Third, causation – the accused’s conduct must have been what caused the harm to the victim.[7] Lastly, concurrence – the accused must have committed the actus reus at the time when he had the requisite mens rea.[8]

Regarding murder specifically: ss 300(a)–(d) of the Penal Code 1871 (the “Penal Code”) govern this crime. This article seeks to mainly examine the actus reus and mens rea of the murder provisions. The actus reus under all four sub-sections of s 300 is the same – the accused must have committed an act which caused the death of the victim. What differs across the different sub-sections is the mens rea requirement.

A. Section 300(a) of the Penal Code

Section 300(a) of the Penal Code imposes liability for murder “if the act [done that caused the death of the deceased] … is done with the intention of causing death”. The mens rea under s 300(a) requires the accused to have the intention of causing the victim’s death. In Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters, the Court of Appeal held that the accused had the intention to kill both victims.[9] The Court found that since the first victim did not attack the accused, there was no reason for the accused to have been so vicious in his attack on the first victim other than to kill him.[10] The congregation of injuries to vulnerable parts of the second victim’s body – the neck, face and scalp – demonstrated that the attacks were targeted.[11] Coupled with the sheer number of times (17 times) he had stabbed and cut the second victim, the Court found that the accused must have intended to cause the second victim’s death.[12] These factors led the Court to conclude that the offender had intended to cause the death of the victims.[13]

B. Section 300(b) of the Penal Code

Section 300(b) of the Penal Code imposes liability for murder if the act in question is “done with the intention to cause a bodily injury to the victim that the accused knows to be likely to cause” the victim’s death. The mens rea under s 300(b) requires the accused to have intended to perform the act and know that the act is likely to cause the victim’s death.[14] This is to be assessed subjectively from the point of view of the accused.[15] This can be gleaned from Illustration (b) of s 300, which “show[s] how the law would apply to a particular fact situation”.[16] Illustration (b) provides that:

A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing that Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health, here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such bodily injury as in the ordinary course of nature would cause death.

From Illustration (b), it is clear that the accused must have had the specific knowledge of victim’s specific vulnerability before the accused could be convicted under s 300(b). This degree of specificity is important, given how Illustration (b) goes on to show that if the accused did not specifically know about the specific vulnerability of the victim, he is not liable under s 300(b).

C. Section 300(c) of the Penal Code

Section 300(c) of the Penal Code imposes liability for murder “if [the act] is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death”. Other than the usual actus reus, there are two other requirements.

First, the bodily injury inflicted must be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.[17] This is to be assessed objectively.[18] Whether a bodily injury is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature is a “matter of scientific fact”.[19] The question thus turns on the “inherent nature of the injuries, without reference to the possible effects of medical intervention”.[20] Whether an accused subjectively knew that the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is irrelevant.[21]

Second, the mens rea under s 300(c) requires the accused to have inflicted the bodily injury with the intention of causing that specific bodily injury on the victim.[22] This is to be assessed subjectively (ie, with reference to the accused’s actual state of mind when inflicting the injury).[23] How s 300(c) differs from s 300(a) is that an accused person only needs to intend a bodily injury that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary cause of action; the intention to cause death is not necessary. An intention to cause a “particular injury”[24] is sufficient to fulfil the mens rea requirement. Further, there is no need to intend a “precise injury”.[25] For instance, in Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another, the accused inflicted a stab wound on the victim’s thigh.[26] This happened to sever the victim’s femoral vein, leading to his death.[27] The particular injury was the stab wound on the victim’s thigh; whereas the precise injury was the severance of the victim’s femoral vein.[28] The Court of Appeal held that the relevant intention under s 300(c) was present.[29] In holding so, the key question is “whether the wounds that were caused were in fact wounds which [the accused] intended to cause”.[30] Whether the accused knew about the seriousness and fatality of the wounds is not central to the inquiry.[31] Given that the accused intended to cause the stab wound, the requirement was satisfied,[32] and the Court of Appeal held that the charge under s 300(c) was made out against the accused.[33]

D. Section 300(d) of the Penal Code

Section 300(d) of the Penal Code imposes criminal liability if an accused committed an act knowing that “it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death” and commits the act “without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death, or such injury”. Therefore, s 300(d) envisions two different situations. First, where the accused’s act “is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death”.[34] Second, where “the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death”.[35] Thus far, only the first situation has been considered by the Singapore Courts.

With regards to the first situation, four requirements must be established.[36] The first and second requirements relate to the actus reus of the crime. First, as with the other sub-sections under s 300, the accused must have done an act which caused the victim’s death. Second, the accused’s act must have been so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death.[37] This requires the act to be an “immediate source of danger; it will not suffice if the risk will only eventuate sometime in the future”.[38] Additionally, the “prospect of death [must be] so swift and sure that as a practical matter, it is an almost certain outcome”.[39] As is evident, this requirement poses a very high threshold to be met. In Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah (“Govindasamy”), the accused started a fire in an enclosed office space that contained flammable materials like wooden furniture, files, and papers.[40] The victim was also left unconscious at the far end of the office.[41] Notwithstanding that, the High Court found that the act was not so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death.[42] The High Court reasoned that the victim “was not injured so badly that she would not have regained consciousness, nor was she injured to the extent of being completely immobile”.[43] Further, the accused only started the fire at one place in the office and no accelerants were used.[44] Therefore, while the victim’s death was likely, it was not seen as a practical certainty.[45]

The third requirement relates to the mens rea of the accused – the accused must subjectively know that the act committed must have been so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death.[46] In Govindasamy, the High Court held that this requirement was not satisfied.[47] While the fire was started in an enclosed office space that contained flammable materials, the Public Prosecutor did not argue that the accused knew that the victim would have remained unconscious.[48] Moreover, the accused neither restrained nor confined the victim in any way,[49]  such as to make escape “a practical impossibility”.[50]

Lastly, the act must have been performed without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death.[51] This requirement is said to excuse “acts which, though extremely dangerous, are tolerated by the community even though none of the prescribed exceptions would strictly apply to exclude criminal liability”.[52] However, the Singapore Courts have yet to analyse this requirement.

III. PUNISHMENTS FOR MURDER

Having discussed the elements needed to establish the offence of murder under the various sub-sections of s 300, we now consider the punishments which those convicted of murder may face. Generally, the offence of murder is punished with death or life imprisonment.[53] Whether life imprisonment is a possible sentence for a Court to impose depends on the criminal charge in question (ie, whether the accused was charged and convicted under s 300(a), (b), (c) or (d)). Before further explaining this point, it may be helpful to first understand how a criminal charge is decided and brought against an accused.

The choice of charge for the accused person is made by the Public Prosecutor in the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion.[54] The exercise of prosecutorial discretion hinges on two questions. First, whether the evidence discloses an offence.[55] Second, whether it is in the public interest to bring a prosecution.[56] Such discretion is regulated by internal guidelines.[57] As will become evident in the following paragraph, in the context of a murder offence, the choice of s 300(a), (b), (c) or (d) is important in determining the possible sentence an accused receives.

Where an accused is convicted under s 300(a), there is only one sentence possible – a Court must sentence the accused to death pursuant to s 302(1) of the Penal Code. In contrast, when an accused is convicted under ss 300(b)–(d), a Court has the discretion to sentence the accused person to death or life imprisonment with caning under s 302(2) of the Penal Code. The reason for this distinction can be explained by that fact s 300(a) murder “is one of the most serious offences”[58] in Singapore and “[i]t is right to punish such offenders with the most severe penalty”[59] – namely, the death penalty. This then raises the question – how does a Court exercise its discretion under s 302(2) in choosing between imposing the death penalty and life imprisonment?

In Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing (“Kho Jabing”), the Court of Appeal stated the principle to be followed by the Courts in deciding whether to impose the death penalty is to “discern whether the actions of the offender would outrage the feelings of the community” [emphasis in original].[60] This does not mean that the Courts are to sentence by public opinion.[61] Rather, it is “an exercise in ethical judgment in which the sentencing court expresses the collective conscience of the community through the selection of a condign punishment” –  an objective exercise.[62] The Courts would inquire as to whether the accused has shown a “blatant disregard for human life” [emphasis in original].[63] The Courts will also account for the entirety of the case and consider the offenders’ motives and intention at the time of the offence being committed, as well as any mitigating factors like the offender’s age and intelligence.[64] The following subsections will explore when the discretionary death penalty is or is not warranted.

A. When the discretionary death penalty is warranted

The Courts will find that the death penalty is warranted where there has been a blatant disregard for human life. In a case involving death caused by a violent act, the “savagery of the attack would be indicative of the offender’s disregard for human life”.[65] In Kho Jabing, the accused initially planned to rob the victim. Yet, during the process, he relentlessly struck the victim’s head multiple times using a piece of wood, even after the victim “was no longer retaliating”.[66] The Court of Appeal held that the accused demonstrated a blatant disregard for human life[67] and accordingly imposed the death penalty on the accused.[68] Another case where the accused demonstrated savagery in his actions is Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor and another appeal.[69] The accused had used a 58cm long parang to slash the victim, struck the victim’s head with it – causing a fracture to the victim’s skull – and slit the victim’s throat.[70] The Court of Appeal found that the accused had demonstrated “sheer brutality”[71] and attacked the victim “in a totally savage and merciless manner as though he were attacking a hunted prey”.[72] The Court of Appeal, accordingly, sentenced the accused to death.[73]

The savagery of an attack also partly explains why the assailant who orchestrated the attack on the deceased in Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal (“Chia Kee Chen”)(the second case study alluded to at para 1 of this article)was sentenced to death.[74] The Court of Appeal held that the “viciousness of the attack cannot be denied”.[75] Bloodstains could be seen “on the ground near the [d]eceased’s car, on its windows as well as on the ceiling of the car park [where the accused originally was at] above the car”.[76] In the cabin of a van where the assault continued,[77] bloodstains “were also found on the ceiling, rear door and both side walls of the cabin of the van; further, a wooden floorboard that was originally in the cabin of the van was stained with blood”.[78] There were various attacks on the deceased’s face, resulting in “extensive fractures in the [deceased’s] skull: almost every bone from the bottom of his eye socket to his lower jaw was fractured”.[79]

B. When the discretionary death penalty is not warranted

The Courts are less likely to find that there is blatant disregard for human life where the accused was not aware of the fatal nature of the injuries inflicted onto the victim.[80] In Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor (“Chan Lie Sian”), the accused struck the victim’s head with a metal dumbbell rod multiple times.[81] Although the injuries were “objectively fatal”,[82] whether there is blatant disregard for human life “must necessarily be informed by the [accused’s] knowledge and state of mind at the relevant time”.[83] While the accused prevented witnesses from “obtaining medical attention for the victim and [paraded] the victim’s body to show the consequences of offending the [accused]”,[84]  the Court of Appeal held that if the accused “honestly believed that the victim’s injuries were not fatal”, his conduct would at most constitute a “blatant disregard for the victim’s welfare, which does not carry with it the necessary sanction of the death penalty”.[85] Indeed, the Court of Appeal found in this case that the accused “was not aware, at the time of the attack or in its immediate aftermath, of the fatal nature of the victim’s injuries”.[86]

Additionally, the Court also rejected the Prosecution’s submission that the accused wanted the victim to suffer as much as possible.[87] Unlike in Chia Kee Chen, where the accused was found to have had the intention to inflict as much suffering as possible to the victim (as seen from his statements and the injuries dealt to the victim),[88] the accused in Chan Lie Sian did not have such an intention.[89] The Court stated that if the accused had the intention to inflict suffering, the “principal attack would not have lasted only 15 minutes and the blows to the victim’s head would not have almost entirely resulted in impacts of only mild to moderate force”.[90]

Taking similar factors into account, it is understandable why the Court of Appeal likewise did not impose the death penalty in Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal (the first case study alluded to at para 1 of this article).[91] The mother was unaware that the injuries inflicted on the deceased could result in the latter’s death.[92] The mother had thought that the scald injuries would be healed by themselves.[93] Additionally, the “scalding injuries [were] not patently or manifestly of a potentially fatal nature”.[94] Further, the mother tried to administer self-help treatments on the deceased.[95] Although they were “woefully inadequate”,[96] this suggested that the accused “was trying to aid the” deceased.[97] Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the mother did not show a blatant disregard for human life.[98]

IV. CONCLUSION

In sentencing an accused person convicted of murder, the Courts would sometimes need to decide whether to impose life imprisonment or the death penalty. This is undoubtedly a difficult decision to make. After all, the death penalty is said to be the “final and terminal sentence … a convicted person can suffer”.[99] Despite this, allowing judicial discretion in choosing between the death penalty or life imprisonment with caning for the offence of murder may be advantageous, as it gives the Courts the chance to assess each case on its own facts in deciding whether the accused indeed deserves the death penalty.

Courts have to exercise this discretion carefully and approach this inquiry by asking the question of whether the offender’s act had outraged the feelings of the community and demonstrated a blatant disregard for human life. The process is very much an evidence-based one, requiring the Courts to consider the totality and circumstances of the case, including relevant offender specific factors. When a life is taken and lost, the criminal law steps in to bring justice and vindicate the great wrong done to the victims and the public. In doing so, the law ensures fairness and – as much as possible – consistency in the way offenders are convicted and sentenced.

— — — For a PDF version of this article, click here — — —

* The authors of this article are grateful to Professor Chan Wing Cheong, Senior Lecturer Ong Ee Ing and the editors at SMU Lexicon for their review. All errors remain our own.

[1] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [1] (CA).

[2] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [37] (CA).

[3] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [1] (CA).

[4] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [142]–[143] (CA).

[5] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 3.3.

[6] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 4.1.

[7] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 5.1.

[8] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 6.1.

[9] Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505 at [45] and [60] (CA).

[10] Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505 at [45] (CA).

[11] Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505at [60] (CA).

[12] Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505at [60] (CA).

[13] Iskandar bin Rahmat v Public Prosecutor and other matters [2017] 1 SLR 505at [45] and [60] (CA).

[14] Public Prosecutor v Khoo Kwee Hock Leslie [2019] SGHC 215 at [100] (HC).

[15] Public Prosecutor v Khoo Kwee Hock Leslie [2019] SGHC 215 at [100] (HC).

[16] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 1.52.

[17] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and other appeals [2022] 2 SLR 825 at [71] (CA).

[18] Kho Jabing and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 634 at [22] (CA).

[19] Ike Mohamed Yasin bin Hussin v Public Prosecutor [1974-1976] SLR(R) 596 at [9] (PC).

[20] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 9.61.

[21] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at paras 9.62 and 9.68.

[22] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and other appeals [2022] 2 SLR 825 at [71]–[72] (CA).

[23] Kho Jabing and another v Public Prosecutor [2011] 3 SLR 634 at [22] (CA).

[24] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [37] (CA).

[25] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [37] (CA).

[26] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [14] (CA).

[27] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [14] (CA).

[28] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [37] (CA).

[29] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [37]–[45] (CA).

[30] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [40] (CA).

[31] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [40] (CA).

[32] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [37] (CA).

[33] Public Prosecutor v Lim Poh Lye and another [2005] 4 SLR(R) 582 at [63] (CA).

[34] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [40] (HC).

[35] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [40] (HC).

[36] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [40] (HC).

[37] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [40] (HC).

[38] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [44] (HC).

[39] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [45] (HC).

[40] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [52] (HC).

[41] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [52] (HC).

[42] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [63] (HC).

[43] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [54] (HC).

[44] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [56]–[57] (HC).

[45] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [63] (HC).

[46] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [40] [46] (HC).

[47] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [71] (HC).

[48] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [71] (HC).

[49] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [71] (HC).

[50] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [60] (HC).

[51] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [40] (HC).

[52] Public Prosecutor v Govindasamy s/o Nallaiah [2016] 3 SLR 374 at [47] (HC).

[53] Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan & Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Singapore (LexisNexis, 2022) at para 8.55.

[54] Constitution of the Republic of Singapore Art 35(8).

[55] Steven Chong S.C., Attorney General (as he then was), Attorney General’s Chambers, “Publication of Prosecutorial Guidelines: Publication for Whom, and Publication to What End”, lecture at the Association of Criminal Lawyers of Singapore Annual Lecture (2013) at para 5, <https://www.agc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/speeches/2013/acls-lecture-2013.pdf> (accessed 22 March 2024).

[56] Steven Chong S.C., Attorney General (as he then was), Attorney General’s Chambers, “Publication of Prosecutorial Guidelines: Publication for Whom, and Publication to What End”, lecture at the Association of Criminal Lawyers of Singapore Annual Lecture (2013) at para 5, <https://www.agc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/speeches/2013/acls-lecture-2013.pdf> (accessed 22 March 2024).

[57] Steven Chong S.C., Attorney General (as he then was), Attorney General’s Chambers, “Publication of Prosecutorial Guidelines: Publication for Whom, and Publication to What End”, lecture at the Association of Criminal Lawyers of Singapore Annual Lecture (2013) at para 5, <https://www.agc.gov.sg/docs/default-source/speeches/2013/acls-lecture-2013.pdf> (accessed 22 March 2024).

[58] Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (9 July 2012) vol 89 <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/#/topic?reportid=018_20120709_S0019_T0002> at 267 (accessed 22 March 2024) (K Shanmugam, Minister for Law).

[59] Singapore Parliamentary Debates, Official Report (9 July 2012) vol 89 <https://sprs.parl.gov.sg/search/#/topic?reportid=018_20120709_S0019_T0002> at 267 (accessed 22 March 2024) (K Shanmugam, Minister for Law).

[60] Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 at [51] (CA).

[61] Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 at [89] (CA).

[62] Kho Jabing v Public Prosecutor [2016] 3 SLR 135 at [90] (CA).

[63] Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 at [51] (CA).

[64] Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 at [51] (CA).

[65] Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 at [51] (CA).

[66] Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 at [72] (CA).

[67] Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 at [72] (CA).

[68] Public Prosecutor v Kho Jabing [2015] 2 SLR 112 at [84] (CA).

[69] Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 748 (CA).

[70] Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 748 at [49] (CA).

[71] Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 748 at [49] (CA).

[72] Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 748 at [49] (CA).

[73] Micheal Anak Garing v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2017] 1 SLR 748 at [36] and [63] (CA).

[74] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [142]–[143] (CA).

[75] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [140] (CA).

[76] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [140] (CA).

[77] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [140] (CA).

[78] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [140] (CA).

[79] Public Prosecutor v Chia Kee Chen and another appeal [2018] 2 SLR 249 at [140] (CA).

[80] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [88] (CA).

[81] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [1] (CA).

[82] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [88] (CA).

[83] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [88] (CA).

[84] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [88] (CA).

[85] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [88] (CA).

[86] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [88] (CA).

[87] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [89]–[90] (CA).

[88] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [89]–[90] (CA).

[89] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [90] (CA).

[90] Chan Lie Sian v Public Prosecutor [2019] 2 SLR 439 at [90] (CA).

[91] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [37] (CA).

[92] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [28] (CA).

[93] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [30] (CA).

[94] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [30] (CA).

[95] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [31] (CA).

[96] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [31] (CA).

[97] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [31] (CA).

[98] Public Prosecutor v Azlin bte Arujunah and another appeal [2022] 2 SLR 1410 at [37] (CA).

[99] Public Prosecutor v Khoo Kwee Hock Leslie [2019] SGHC 215 at [167] (HC).