Differing Common Intention Charges: Public Prosecutor v Aishamudin bin Jamaludin [2020] SGCA 70

Under section 34 of the Penal Code (Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed) (“Penal Code”), can the Prosecution charge two different people based on a common intention to commit a criminal act between them, but press a more serious charge against one accused person and a less serious charge against the other (“differing common intention charges”)? The Court of Appeal (“CA”) held that there was nothing under section 34 which required the Prosecution to bring identical charges against all who were charged pursuant to a common intention to do a criminal act. Further, there were good reasons why there was no general rule requiring the Prosecution to do so.

The Limits to Freedom of Contract: Leiman, Ricardo and another v Noble Resources Ltd and another [2020] SGCA 52

In line with the principle of freedom to contract, the courts will give effect to the intention of the parties in creating their contract, and also hold them to their duty to perform their primary obligations under such contract. However, where the contracting parties agree to vest certain decision-making powers to a specific (non-judicial) entity, to what extent may a court review the exercise of powers by such entity?

Erring on the Side of Disclosure: the Prosecution’s Additional Disclosure Obligations under Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984

The Prosecution has been described as owing “a duty to the court and to the wider public to ensure that only the guilty are convicted, and that all relevant material is placed before the court to assist it in its determination of the truth”. However, what exactly does the scope of this duty entail? The Court of Appeal (“CA”) addressed this question in Muhammad Nabill bin Mohd Fuad v Public Prosecutor [2020] 1 SLR 984.

Clarifying “cannabis” and “cannabis mixture”: Saravanan Chandaram v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 43

How should cannabis and cannabis mixture be defined? Should the penalty on trafficking, importing, or exporting of cannabis mixture be calibrated based on the gross weight? Can the Prosecution charge an alleged offender with both knowledge of importing cannabis and cannabis mixture? These are some of the questions the Court of Appeal (“CA”) answered in Saravanan Chandaram v Public Prosecutor [2020] SGCA 43.

A Balanced Approach to Causation in Breaches of Fiduciary Duty: Sim Poh Ping v Winsta Holding [2020] SGCA 35

A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of another (his principal). As such, a fiduciary owes an obligation of loyalty to the principal. Indeed, the principal relies on the fiduciary to act in his or her best interests, and is especially vulnerable to the fiduciary’s breach of duty. Thus, it has been observed that a fiduciary owes his or her principal the highest standard of duty known to the law. It is also well-established that a director of a company has a fiduciary relationship with the company.

A Modified Approach to Breach of Confidence: I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting and others [2020] SGCA 32

Can an employer sue a former employee for the mere wrongful copying, abuse and exploitation of protected information, without also having to prove that the employee wrongfully used the information? This was the question before the Court of Appeal (“CA”) in I-Admin (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Hong Ying Ting and others [2020] SGCA 32.

Unpacking Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: Public Prosecutor v GCK [2020] SGCA 2

What happens when a criminal act is alleged, and the only evidence is from a sole eyewitness (i.e. the evidence is uncorroborated)? In Public Prosecutor v GCK [2020] SGCA 2, the Singapore Court of Appeal clarified that the "unusually convincing" standard applies to such cases as well, and is not just limited to cases dealing with sexual offences. Furthermore, a stricter standard is not to be imposed for cases dealing with sole eyewitnesses.